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Abstract
Background: The Myanmar army and ethnic armed groups agreed to a preliminary ceasefire in 2012, but a heavy
military presence remains in southeastern Myanmar. Qualitative data suggested this militarization can result in human
rights abuses in the absence of armed engagements between the parties, and that rural ethnic civilians use a variety of
self-protection strategies to avoid these abuses or reduce their negative impacts. We used data from a household survey
to determine prevalence of select self-protection activities and to examine exposure to armed groups, human rights
violations and self-protection activities as determinants of health in southeastern Myanmar.
Methods and findings: Data collected from 463 households via a two-stage cluster survey of conflict-affected areas
in eastern Myanmar in January 2012, were analyzed using logistic regression models to identify associations between
exposure to state and non-state armed groups, village self-protection, human rights abuses and health outcomes.
Close proximity to a military base was associated with human rights abuses (PRR 1.30, 95 % CI: 1.14-1.48), inadequate
food production (PRR 1.08, 95 % CI: 1.03-1.13), inability to access health care (PRR 1.29, 95 % CI: 1.04-1.60) and diarrhea
(PRR 1.15, 95 % CI: 1.05-1.27. Direct exposure to armed groups was associated with household hunger (PRR1.71, 95 %
CI: 1.30-2.23). Among households that reported no human rights abuses, risk of household hunger (PRR 5.64, 95 %
CI: 1.88-16.91), inadequate food production (PRR 1.95, 95 % CI: 1.11-3.41) and diarrhea (PRR 2.53, 95 % CI: 1.45-4.42)
increased when neighbors’ households reported experiencing human rights abuses. Households in villages that
reported negotiating with the Myanmar army had lower risk of human rights violations (PRR 0.91, 95 % CI: 0.85-0.98),
household hunger (PRR 0.85, 95 % CI: 0.74-0.96), inadequate food production (PRR 0.93, 95 % CI:0.89-0.98) and diarrhea
(PRR 0.89, 95 % CI:0.82-0.97). Stratified analysis suggests that self-protection strategies may modify the effect of exposure
to armed groups on risk of human rights violations and some health outcomes.
Conclusion: Militarization may negatively affect health in southeastern Myanmar, and village self-protection activities
may reduce these impacts. As southeastern Myanmar opens to international health and development interventions,
implementing agencies should consider militarization as a determinant of health and design interventions that can
mediate its effects. Such interventions should take into account existing self-protection strategies, seek to provide
support where possible and, at all times, take care not to unintentionally undermine them.
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Background
Southeastern Myanmar, encompassing eastern Bago region,
Mon and Karen states, and Tanintharyi Region, bordering
Thailand, has for decades been made up of a patchwork of
state and ethnic armed groups seeking to administer over-
lapping territories [1]. During 60 years of conflict in south
eastern Myanmar, human rights violations have had detri-
mental effects on health, including direct injury, loss of
food supplies, malnutrition, inability to access healthcare
and loss of capital used to produce health [2–6].
In early 2012 the Government of Myanmar began agree-
ing to preliminary ceasefires with these groups and, though
the negotiation process remains ongoing, this has resulted
in a significant reduction in armed conflicts – though not a
complete cessation. Reports from these areas over the last
two decades, however, indicate that militarization, or the
presence of the armed actors, even in the absence of armed
clashes can result in human rights violations, including
forced labour, capricious taxation, and land grabbing; arbi-
trary arrest, detention and execution; forced relocation and
movement restrictions; and sexual violence [7–9]. This sug-
gests that, even following ceasefires or the otherwise cessa-
tion of violent clashes in the region, civilians’ health and
human rights may still be affected by the presence of the
military [10].
Southeastern Myanmar is an example of a region in
which international interventions to protect civilians from
conflict and armed groups have had mixed results. This is
primarily because, throughout the period of armed conflict
(1948–2012), international humanitarian protection actors
were denied access to civilian populations. In comparison
to international efforts, it has been widely recognized that
local strategies to manage risks associated with conflict
and militarization can be extremely effective, though they
should not be taken as a substitute for parties to conflict
meeting their responsibilities to respect obligations under
human rights and humanitarian law. The Active Learning
Network for Accountability in Practice (ALNAP) guide for
humanitarian protection, for example, notes that “Humani-
tarian common sense affirms the value of people's own
knowledge, capacity, insight and innovation in any given
situation that threatens them… People are seldom passive
when they feel at risk: they engage in a range of finely
judged actions to cope, respond, adapt and survive” [11].
Critics also note, however, that top-down international
approaches rarely incorporate civilians’ management of
their own risks or inform civilians how best to manage risk
[12–14].
Local self-protection strategies have been well-
documented in southeastern Myanmar. Beginning in the
early 2000s, local organization the Karen Human Rights
Group (KHRG) also began seeking to document individ-
ual and village-level self-protection strategies and then
develop interventions to strengthen the most effective
approaches [8]. Building on this, the Local to Global Protec-
tion Project, began additional research on these strategies
and potentials for international support [9]. These studies
identified multiple effective strategies used by villagers to
protect themselves both from abuse associated with clashes
between armed groups (e.g., targeted attacks on civilians,
indiscriminate fire) and those abuses that occur in light of
militarization, particularly administration of territory by the
state army rather than civilian authorities (forced labour
and capricious taxation; arbitrary arrest, detention and exe-
cution; forced relocation and movement restrictions). These
strategies can be organized into the three-part typology,
which categorizes self-protection strategies as containing,
avoiding, or confronting protection threats [15]. In south-
eastern Myanmar, examples of these strategies have ranged
from negotiating with armed groups, fleeing the village to
avoid abuse, to using homemade landmines and Gher der
(“home guard” militias) to protect villages [7–9]. Strategies
that are assessed by this research, which represent just a
few of the self-protection activities people use, are fleeing,
refusing to comply, negotiating and paying bribes to reduce
goods or labor demanded by armed groups.
Following the end of a major military offensive during
2005–2008, levels of armed conflict in southeast Myanmar
waned substantially, though some localized areas continued
to see fighting through the end of 2011 [7, 16]. Initial cease-
fires in early 2012, along with political liberalizations in the
Myanmar government, have led to dramatically increased
international development aid for Myanmar, including in
the southeast. As previous governments in Myanmar
restricted access of humanitarian groups to conflict zones,
experience working in these areas is largely limited to
community-based groups. Challenges for new development
efforts will include understanding determinants of health
unique to southeastern Myanmar, where conflict has abated
yet militarization persists.
We analyzed associations between exposure to armed
groups and exposure to human rights violations as predic-
tors of low food security and poor health outcomes, and we
examined self-protection strategies as modifiers of these
relationships.
Methods
The data for these analyses were collected through a multi-
stage cluster survey conducted in southeastern Myanmar in
2012 initially designed to identify household-level associa-
tions between human rights violations and health outcomes
[17]. In this analysis, information collected at the household
level (human rights violations, exposures to armed groups,
health outcomes and community self-protection activities)
was used to create village-level variables (any or no com-
munity self-protection activities), combined with data col-
lected from village leaders (distance to military base) to
examine determinants of health. We examined associations
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between militarization and human rights violations,
militarization and health outcomes, human rights vi-
olations and health, and effect modification of self-
protection on these associations.
Survey instrument
The survey questionnaire comprised four modules that
assessed demographics and health of household members,
access to health care, food security and human rights viola-
tions. One respondent for each household answered for all
individuals in the household. The first module covered age
and sex distribution of household members, middle-upper
arm circumference of children under five, night blindness
and diarrhea (both in the two weeks prior to the survey) in
all household members. The next module covered access to
health care in southeast Myanmar. The third module cov-
ered food security in two sections: the six-question USAID
Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project (FANTA)
household hunger (HHH) survey, which covered one
month prior to the survey, and the months of adequate
household food production (MAHFP) survey [18, 19].
Months of adequate household food production is a count
of the number of months in the preceding year that the
household had sufficient food. The final module covered
human rights violations, exposure to armed groups and
self-protection activities, all with a recall period of the year
before the survey. Six responses were possible for the
village self-protection question, based on what community
groups said were most common and what could be most
accurately captured with this survey instrument: negotiate
(with armed groups for reductions in demands of goods
or labor), pay (to reduce labor/goods demanded), flee (to
avoid complying with demands), refuse (to comply with
demands), no response and don’t know.
Sampling
The sampling universe for the original survey, shown on a
previously published map [17], included 80,000 adults and
children living in 250 villages in clinical catchment areas
served by community-based health organizations in south-
eastern Myanmar. Implementing partners provided popu-
lation data from the areas where they worked. No major
population movements were reported in these areas during
the time covered by the survey. Some forced displacement
did result from conflict land confiscations, and economic
migration was likely ongoing, but we do not feel that these
movements would significantly change the implementing
partners’ population figures [20].
According to sample size calculations for the original
survey, we needed to approach 720 households in order
to estimate with 5 % precision prevalence of human
rights violations on the order of 15 %. The calculation
assumed a survey return rate of 82 % (based on previous
surveys in the research area) [4, 5, 21–23] and a design
effect of 3.0 (because human rights violations typically
cluster within communities at higher rates than other
outcomes more commonly measured in health surveys).
To reach 720 households, we undertook a 90 cluster x 8
household per cluster design; this many-clusters-of-
small-size approach was followed to minimize design ef-
fect (presuming uneven distribution of outcomes across
clusters), to reduce the impact on data if a surveyor lost
data forms if he or she had to suddenly flee the village,
to minimize the time each surveyor spent in a village (8
interviews took two days) and to balance logistical con-
straints of travel time between villages. In the first stage
of sampling, villages were enumerated and selected
randomly with probabilities proportional to each village’s
population. In the second stage, eight households in
each village were selected randomly using the Expanded
Programme on Immunisation (EPI) method, which
entails locating the approximate center of the village,
randomly selecting a direction, randomly selecting one
house along that direction between the center and edge
of the village, and sampling that house and the seven
closest houses [5, 24–30].
Instrument development and surveyor training
The survey was based on a questionnaire used previously
in Chin State, Myanmar [31] that was modified by local
partners to accurately capture events in southeastern
Myanmar [32]. The modification process involved exten-
sive consultation with community-based human rights
groups; this led to inclusion of questions that enabled us
to analyze the relationships between militarization, abuses
and self-protection strategies. The survey instrument was
translated into Sgaw Karen and Burmese and then back-
translated to English to ensure accuracy. The survey ques-
tionnaire covered exposure to armed groups, human
rights violations, distance to the nearest Myanmar army
base, and self-protection activities. Six responses were
possible for the village self-protection question: negotiate
reduction in labor demanded, pay to reduce the labor
demanded, flee to avoid forced labor, refuse to do the
labor demanded, no response and don’t know.
Partner community-based organizations contributed
22 surveyors (16 male, six female, 20–38 years old)
who were working inside the study area, fluent in
Burmese or Sgaw Karen and had extensive political
and geographical knowledge of the region in which
they worked. For security reasons, they were assigned
clusters only in their home regions. Surveyors were
trained in lectures and practice sessions on taking
informed consent, the survey instrument and measur-
ing middle-upper arm circumference (MUAC) of chil-
dren under five over two weeks. They were required
to pass an exam before implementing the survey.
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Implementation
Surveyors conducted the study in January 2012, and the
questionnaire covered events that occurred 12 months
prior to the survey, with the exception of the household
hunger section (one month recall) and health status
questions (two weeks recall). Surveyors first obtained
consent from village leaders and asked about exposure
to armed groups and health problems, then interviewed
households. Participants were 18 years old or older (15 if
married) living in the survey area, who spoke Burmese or
Sgaw Karen, gave informed consent and were deemed by
the surveyors to be psychologically competent to participate
in the survey. Anyone who ate meals in the house for two
months preceding the survey was included as a household
member.
Statistical analysis
Only households in areas affected by conflict and
militarization (everywhere but Dawei/Tavoy area in the
original survey, which we assumed was non-conflict and
administered by civilian authorities) were included in
this secondary analysis; 463 households of the original
households sampled (66.5 %) were located in conflict-
affected areas and only these were included in the
analysis for this paper. While the original survey was
sufficient to provide approximately 5 % precision around
human rights violations occurring at 15 % frequency, the
reduced sample size available for this secondary analysis
reduces that precision to approximately 6.2 %. Data (out-
comes and exposures) were weighted at either the clinical
area level or the village level by population, and all analyses
were performed with STATA 13 using svy commands to
apply Taylor linearization, which enables conservative esti-
mation of variance when clusters are of different sizes (as
in this case). Survey coverage and participation rates were
estimated. Prevalence of human rights violations, health
and nutrition outcomes, and self-protection activities were
estimated and 95 % confidence intervals were calculated.
The goal of the interpretive analysis was to quantify asso-
ciations (numbered 1 through 10 in Fig. 1) of determinants
of health and to examine self-protection as a modifier of
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-DiarrheaIncreased risk
Associations Examined in this Analysis
Association Exposure Exposure unit Outcome Outcome unit
1
Human rights 




Household (not exposed to human 
rights violations)
3 Distance to base Village Human rights violations Household
4 Distance to base Village Health Household
5 Armed groups Household Human rights violations Household
6 Armed groups Household Health Household
7 Self-protection Village Human rights violations Household
8 Self-protection Village Health Household
9, 10, 11 Self-protection Village
Effect modifications of 
associations 1,2,3,4,5,6 Household
Fig. 1 Associations Examined in this Analysis
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were adjusted for household size, area, type of water supply,
religion, ethnicity, female-headed household and terrain
(mountain or plains) using stepwise forward selection with
p < 0.10 as selection criteria; unadjusted models were also
done. Prevalence rate ratios between exposure to armed
groups, human rights violations and health outcomes and
95 % confidence intervals were estimated using generalized
linear models with log link functions or Poisson regression
when models did not converge. We coded household hun-
ger (moderate/severe and none/mild), months of adequate
household food production (1–9 months/ 10–12 months)
and diarrhea and night blindness (present/ not present) and
human rights violations (any/none) as binary variables.
The months of adequate household food production cut-
off of nine months best captured the difference between
households that experienced human rights violations and
those that did not. About 15 % of the questions on self-
protection and distance to base were missing, likely be-
cause of the sensitive nature of the questions. We used
listwise deletion to handle missing data.
We first investigated militarization as a risk factor for hu-
man rights violations, using distance to Myanmar military
base (defined in terms of time spent walking between the
location of residence and military bases; time walking was
used because foot travel was the primary mode of travel
and mountainous topography means linear distances are
rarely referenced by populations living in the research area)
or exposures (defined as seeing any armed group, seeing
specific armed groups, and the total number of different
armed groups seen) as predictors (associations 3 and 5,
Fig. 1).
Next we examined determinants of household health.
We estimated the risks of diarrhea, household hunger
(HHH), being sick and not able to access treatment (sick
and no tx), and nine or fewer months of adequate house-
hold food production (MAHFP) using proximity to the
nearest military base or exposure to armed groups as pre-
dictors (associations 4 and 6, Fig. 1). In a subpopulation of
households that did not report human rights violations, we
estimated the risk of poor health if other households in the
same village reported human rights violations (associations
1 and 2, Fig. 1).
Finally we investigated the effects of self-protection on
human rights violations and on health. For each village
sampled, we combined the responses for household self-
protection and, for the whole village, generated continu-
ous village self-protection variables. For each village the
total number of any single self-protection activity (e.g. ne-
gotiation) was between 0 and 8, the maximum number of
households surveyed in the village. According to existing
research reverenced above, interactions between armed
groups and civilians tend to be done at a village level, for
example, armed groups will demand a certain number of
porters of bags of rice from a village, and the village must
decide how this burden will be distributed among house-
holds. Armed groups less frequently make specific
demands of a single household. Because civilians tends to
interact with armed groups as a village unit, treating self-
protection as a village-level continuous variable most
accurately reflected the dynamics between armed groups
and civilians in southeastern Myanmar.
We examined associations between village self-protection
and exposure to armed groups, human rights violations
and health outcomes all measured at the household level
(associations 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 in Fig. 1). Next we stratified the
dataset by village self-protection and examined associations
between exposure to armed groups and outcomes of
human rights violations or health. Small sample sizes pre-
cluded an analysis of interaction terms in multiple logistic
regression.
This study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health, the Ethics Review Board at Physicians for Human
Rights, and an ad hoc Karen community advisory team.
Results and discussion
Sampling is shown in Fig. 2. Surveyors approached 90
villages, omitted 10 because of security reasons, and
substituted eight by selecting the villages closest to the
insecure villages. One village leader refused to consent to
the survey, and 88 villages were included in the original
analysis. Of the households approached, 9 did not consent
to the survey. For the sub-analysis described here, we
included 551 households that were located in militarized
and conflict-affected areas. We dropped 88 (16 %) house-
holds from the analysis because they refused to answer the
self-protection questions, thus 463 households were
included in the final analysis. This sample included 2471
people.
Health, human rights and self-protection outcomes and
exposures to militarization are shown in Table 1. Of 463
households surveyed, 148 (26.8 %, 95 % CI: 20.4-34.2)
reported experiencing at least one human rights violation,
354 (79.7 %, 95 % CI: 72.7-85.3) reported seeing at least one
armed group, and 226 (48.7 %, 95 % CI: 38.4-59.3) reported
engaging in at least one self-protection activity in the year
prior to the survey. The distance between surveyed house-
hold and the nearest army base ranged from 1 to 30 h
hiking.
We identified several statistically significant associations
between militarization, human rights violations and poor
health outcomes (Table 2). Proximity to military bases was
associated with increased risk of human rights violations
and poor health outcomes. For each hour of hiking closer
to a Myanmar army base (relative to responding house-
hold’s location), a household’s risk of experiencing any hu-
man rights violation increased by 30 % (1.30, 95 % CI: 1.14-
1.48). Similarly, risk of reporting <10 months of adequate
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household food production increased by 8 % (1.08, 95 % CI:
1.03-1.13), risk of a household member being sick and not
able to receive treatment increased by 29 % (01.29, 95 % CI:
1.04-1.60), and risk of a household member reporting diar-
rhea increased by 15 % (1.15, 95 % CI: 1.05-1.27). For each
of the outcomes, design effects were calculated; these
ranged from 0.8 to 2.1.
Exposure to armed groups was also associated with in-
creased risk of a household experiencing human rights
violations and poor health: households that reported seeing
Myanmar army or Border Guard Forces were 5.7 times
more likely to report moderate or severe household hunger
(95 % CI: 2.5-13.0) and 12.5 times more likely to report that
a household member was sick and not able to get treatment
(95 % CI: 5.06-30.69) compared with households that did
not report seeing these groups (Table 2).
Human rights violations of one household were associ-
ated with increased risk of poor health in neighboring
households. Among households that did not report hu-
man rights violations, having a neighbor that reported
human rights violations increased the risk of household
hunger and diarrhea by 5.64 (95 % CI: 1.88-16.91) and
2.53 (95 % CI: 1.45-4.42) times, respectively, compared
with households not having neighbors who reported rights
violations (Additional file 1).
Of the types of self-protection assessed, village negoti-
ation had the most statistically significant results out of all
four forms assessed, and is the only type discussed here
(Table 3, Additional files 1, 2, 3 and 4). Negotiation was
associated with reduced risks of household hunger (PRR
0.85, 95 % CI: 0.74- 0.96), reporting < 10 months of
adequate household food production (PRR 0.93, 95 % CI:
0.89-0.98), diarrhea (RR 0.89, 95 % CI: 0.82-0.97), having a
household member sick and not able to access treatment
(PRR 0.81, 95 % CI:0.71-0.93) and reduced risk of any
human rights violation (PRR 0.91, 95 % CI: 0.85-0.98).
Furthermore, village negotiation appeared to modify the
relationship between exposure to armed groups and human
rights violations and health outcomes (Additional file 3).
Village-level negotiation slightly weakened the associations
between exposure to armed groups and experiencing any
human rights violation (no negotiation PRR 1.74 95 % CI:
1.21-2.51, negotiation PRR 1.66, 95 % CI: 1.25-2.23), sug-
gesting that risk of experiencing human rights violations
might be less in villages that negotiated. The modifying
effect was stronger on the relationship between exposure to
armed groups and health; the greatest differences were in
exposure to the number of armed groups and household
hunger (no negotiation PRR 2.53 95 % CI: 1.59-4.04, nego-
tiation PRR 1.25 95 % CI: 0.36-4.38) and exposure to any
armed group and diarrhea (no negotiation PRR 5.49 95 %
CI: 1.94-15.54, negotiation PRR 0.70 95 % CI: 0.3-1.66),
suggesting that, given the same exposures to armed groups,
households in villages that negotiated tended to have better
Fig. 2 Sampling Scheme
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health outcomes than households in villages that did
not negotiate. Village negotiation also modified the ef-
fect between exposure to Myanmar Army or Border
Guard Forces and health, although for this exposure
the effect was opposite for nine or fewer months of
adequate household food production (no negotiation
PRR 0.56 95 % CI: 0.35-0.90, negotiation PRR 1.26
95 % CI: 0.73-2.18) and diarrhea (no negotiation PRR
0.92 95 % CI: 0.41-2.08, negotiation PRR 1.47 95 % CI:
0.78-2.75), suggesting households in villages that ne-
gotiated with Myanmar Army or Border Guard Forces
had increased risk of these poor health outcomes com-
pared with households in villages that did not negoti-
ate, given the same exposures to these armed groups.
Table 1 Summary of human rights abuses, self-protection activities and militarization measures
Indicator Cases Total Percent 95 % CI
Human Rights Violations
Any household member reporting human rights violations 148 463 26.8 20.4–34.2
Any household member reporting forced labor 129 463 22.1 16.8–28.7
Health
Moderate/severe household hunger 57 459 13.5 8.7–20.2
<10 months of adequate household food production 185 460 38.4 30.0–47.5
Any household member reported sick and unable to access treatment 58 458 11.7 7.4–18.1
Any member of the household reporting
diarrhea
167 2424 7.9 5.5–11.1
Self-protection
Negotiate 138 463 33.2 24.2–43.6
Pay 129 463 22.8 17.1–29.6
Leave 12 463 3.4 1.2–9.2
Refuse 68 463 19.8 12.4–30.1
Any 226 463 48.7 38.4–59.3
Armed groups seen by households
None 109 463 20.3 14.7–27.3
At least one 354 463 79.7 72.7–85.3
Myanmar Army 148 463 31.2 23.7–41.5
Myanmar Army or BGF 179 463 35.7 27.2–45.2
Total number of different armed groups seen by household
0 109 457 20.4 14.8–27.5
1 194 457 48.8 39.1–58.6
2 91 457 21.6 14.1–31.7
3 51 457 7.6 4.6–12.2
4 12 457 1.5 0.6–4.0
Distance to Army base, in hours hiking
1 120 403 25.9 16.9–37.7
2 60 403 19.2 10.7–32.1
3 98 403 21.1 15.3–35.8
4 39 403 7.3 3.2–12.7
5 32 403 6.4 2.6–14.9
6 8 403 1 0.2–4.9
10 14 403 4.7 1.3–15.5
12 16 403 5.3 1.5–16.4
15 9 403 3.4 0.1–14.8
30 7 403 2.7 0.1–13.7
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Table 2 Associations between militarization, human rights violations and health










exposed1 cases2 % exposed3 cases4 % PRR 95 % CI PRR 95 % CI
Distance to base 1.3 1.14–1.48 - -
Saw any armed group 354 133 37.6 109 15 13.8 3.39 1.53–7.55 1.13a 0.58–2.19
Saw MM Army 148 60 40.5 309 85 27.5 1.42 0.85–2.40 1.59a 0.92–2.75








exposed cases % exposed cases % PRR 95 % CI PRR 95 % CI
Distance to base 1.28 1.13–1.46 - -
Saw any armed group 354 116 32.8 109 13 11.9 3.18 1.30–7.83 - -
Saw MM Army 148 52 35.1 309 75 24.3 1.35 0.79–2.30 1.53a 0.86–2.72
Saw MM Army or BGF 127 61 48 330 118 35.8 1.39 0.81–2.38 1.57a 0.88–2.79
Moderate/Severe
Household Hunger
Low Household Hunger Unadjusted
model
Adjusted model
exposed cases % exposed cases % PRR 95 % CI PRR 95 % CI
Distance to base 1.22 0.99–1.49 - -
Saw any armed group 351 50 14.2 108 7 6.5 1.86 0.74–4.73 2.06b 0.88–4.82
Saw MM Army 148 40 27 305 16 5.2 5.59 2.51–12.44 6.01b 2.73–13.25
Saw MM Army or BGF 178 42 23.6 275 14 5.1 5.2 2.28–11.89 5.69b 2.48–13.02
<10 months of adequate
household food production





exposed cases % exposed cases % PRR 95 % CI PRR 95 % CI
Distance to base 1.08 1.03–1.13 - -
Saw any armed group 352 149 42.3 108 36 33.3 1.1 0.77–1.59 1.32b 0.72–2.41
Saw MM Army 147 51 34.7 307 132 43 0.72 0.48–1.07 - -
Saw MM Army or BGF 178 60 33.7 276 123 44.6 0.7 0.46–1.05 0.78b 0.52–1.18
Any household member reported sick
and unable to access treatment
No household member reported sick




exposed cases % exposed cases % PRR 95 % CI PRR 95 % CI
Distance to base 1.29 1.04–1.60 - -
Saw any armed group 349 53 15.2 109 5 4.6 3.3 1.09–9.91 3.57b 1.27–10.02
Saw MM Army 147 44 29.9 305 13 4.3 8.89 3.91–20.15 11.4b 5.18–24.88
Saw MM Army or BGF 176 48 27.3 276 9 3.3 11.01 4.33–28.34 12.46b 5.06–30.69
Any member of the household
reporting diarrhea





exposed cases % exposed cases % PRR 95 % CI PRR 95 % CI
Distance to base 1.15 1.05–1.27 - -
Saw any armed group 1847 140 7.6 577 27 4.7 1.51 0.80–2.84 - -
Saw MM Army 800 64 8 1596 102 6.4 1.13 0.58–2.19 - -
Saw MM Army or BGF 950 69 7.3 1446 97 6.7 1.02 0.54–1.90 1.12b 0.60–2.10
aadjusted for mountainous terrain
badjusted for mountainous terrain, source of drinking water
1Number of households exposed to “militarization” e.g. saw any armed group
2Number of households that were exposed to militarization that also reported a human rights violation
3Number of households that were not exposed to any armed group
4Number of households not exposed to any armed group but that did report a human rights violation
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Discussion
The data presented here extends previous research on
health and human rights in eastern Myanmar. It suggests
that militarization could be a determinant of health, that
human rights violations experienced by one household
could affect health in other households in the same village,
and that actions taken by households might mitigate these
effects.
Health is an effective measure for examining the results
of militarization, violence and human rights violations,
[33–35] and conflict is a well-documented determinant of
health. It is associated with increased mortality from direct
violence, but it also affects distal determinants of morbid-
ity and mortality by limiting access to healthcare, disrupt-
ing health services, depressing the economy and creating
food insecurity [36–43]. The mechanisms through which
militarization in southeast Myanmar could affect health
might be similar to the effects of conflict on health. That
hiking time to an army base is a predictor of increased risk
of human rights violations suggests that abuses by the
army continue to be widespread and systematic in Karen
state, despite reduced conflict.
This study suggests that human rights violations experi-
enced by one household might affect the health of a
nearby household. Several mechanisms could explain this
relationship: through stifling village economic production
and trade (for example, when forced labor limits house-
hold productivity), by limiting movement and thus trans-
port of medicine, by frightening witnesses of human rights
violations into hiding and limiting household productivity,
or by creating burdens on households that experienced
rights violations that are shared by other households
through social, economic and family networks. Human
rights violations in neighbors’ households may also indi-
cate a high level exposure to militarization, and the mech-
anisms through which militarization may affect health,
such as through stifling the economy, limiting access to
fields or hospitals, or suppressing the health system, may
also be present.
This study confirms for the first time that self-protection
strategies are widely used in this setting, which supports
previously qualitative arguments that people are not
‘passive victims’ of conflict [11]. That civilians in southeast-
ern Myanmar have the capacity to successfully use self-
protection suggests that international actors in the region
and in other contexts should continue to explore ways to
support these activities. At a minimum, international actors
should take care not to unintentionally undermine or con-
strain the use of such strategies, as this would then have
unintended negative health outcomes.
We identified several cases in which negotiation weak-
ened the effect of militarization on poor health outcomes,
and two cases in which village negotiation strengthened the
association. The discrepancy might be explained by
unmeasured variables, such as proximity to roads, access to
aid from CBOs, other unmeasured forms of self-protection
or multiple exposures to the same armed group. The effects
of self-protection on health may also involve mechanisms
other than influencing the actions of armed groups. Villages
that engage in self-protection may be more likely to engage
in health-seeking behaviors (through self-efficacy or dignity
mechanisms) or have improved mental health, both of
which could affect physical health. Because villagers know
the context of the conflict and (usually) the personalities of
local commanders and units, they may only try to negotiate
with specific armed groups with which they think there is
some chance of success. Finally, self-protection may func-
tion at low-dose exposures to armed groups but, at higher
doses or where the needs of armed actors are overwhelm-
ing and space for negotiation ceases to exist, they may be
less effective or entail negative secondary effects [7].
This research contributes quantitative data to a growing
body of evidence of successful ways in which civilians
reduce risk of harm in times of conflict. Previous qualitative
research in southeastern Myanmar suggests that villagers
manage threats by complying with demands or negotiating
with armed groups, avoiding threats by fleeing and con-
fronting threats through public advocacy and active resist-
ance [9]. Previous research found that paying bribes to
armed groups was common and usually successful, as was
selecting older women village as leaders who were seen as
being better able to negotiate with armed groups, and could
sometimes get compensation from the army for attacks and
also prevent forced relocations [9]. Villages also said that
they would under-report their labor force or amount of
food supplies in order to reduce the amount of food or
labor demanded [9].
Other forms of negotiation, such as political activism
and bearing witness, have been documented in both con-
flict and militarized non-conflict settings. For example,
other forms of negotiation, such as political activism and
Table 3 Associations between village negotiation
and human rights violations and health indicators
PRR 95 % CI
Moderate/Severe
Household Hunger
0.85 0.74 – 0.96
<10 months of adequate
household food production
0.93 0.89 – 0.98
Any member of the household
reporting diarrhea
0.89 0.82 – 0.97
Any household member reported
sick and unable to access treatment
0.81 0.71 – 0.93
Any household member reporting
human rights violations
0.91 0.85 – 0.98
Any household member reporting
forced labor
0.92 0.86 – 1.00
All results were obtained using unadjusted models
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bearing witness, were documented in women’s rights
groups in Afghanistan and community-based groups in
Guatemala [44, 45]. In the Afghan case, community
groups organized humanitarian and political activities to
encourage people to resist oppression. Research found
that their activities raised public awareness of oppression
and resulted in stronger communities [44]. Guatemalan
community groups organized health tribunals to advocate
for remediation from mining companies [45].
Civilians in South Kordofan, Sudan, reported that com-
munication with hostile forces could help to reduce the risk
of attack [46]. They suggested it might increase empathy
from soldiers, help soldiers to think about the conse-
quences of their actions, or help to change the political
landscape to one of peace.
Intrastate conflicts are increasingly common, and they
pose new threats as civilians become displaced and access
by international groups is limited or nonexistent [47]. In
these situations community roles for preventing violence
and reducing risks from conflict become more important
[38]. As knowledge of community self-protection mecha-
nisms increases, international actors will be better able to
incorporate these mechanisms in their protection inter-
ventions [12, 46, 48]. Knowledge of specific strategies that
are effective may inform the development of more suc-
cessful humanitarian interventions. On the other hand,
seeking to understand such strategies is important so that
international actors do not unintentionally undermine
civilians’ efforts. Finally, even where specific strategies
have not yet been identified, recognizing the existing cap-
acities of communities seeking to protect themselves may
be the most important starting point for international
actors.
This research is subject to several limitations. Limitations
of cluster sampling apply to this survey and have been doc-
umented in detail [26, 27, 29, 49]. The results of this survey
cannot be generalized to areas outside of the clinical catch-
ment areas in Karen State where the implementing CBOs
operate, as these areas were not included in the sampling
frame.
Insecurity precluded assessment of ten of the pre-
selected clusters. Systematic differences, if present, in ex-
posures and outcomes in these villages compared with
sampled villages, would likely result in an underestimation
of the associations between human rights violations and
health outcomes.
Sample size limited the analysis: the original survey
was not powered for this analysis, and missing data was
high for questions relating to self-protection activities
and distance to the nearest military base. In only one
village did all eight households refuse to answer any of
the self-protection questions. The remainder were in 22
villages, which were concentrated in two townships
(Hpa An and Hpapun). These townships had the highest
proportion of households reporting seeing Myanmar
army or BGF.
To further explore this, we used logistic regression to
identify predictors of missing self-protection variables and
found that households that had seen the Myanmar army
or allied BGF (but not any armed group) were statistically
less likely to respond to the question on self-protection.
Missing data was not associated with health outcomes
(data not shown). It is possible that people in these areas
were more reluctant to answer these questions because
they perceived a greater threat of reprisal from armed
groups or because they wanted to keep their protection
activities secret.
Qualitative data suggest that, self-protection strategies are
less effective or may result in their own unintended nega-
tive consequences. If this is true, then deleting the missing
data would bias the analysis towards strengthening the
association between self-protection and fewer human rights
violations and better health outcomes. If self-protection
mechanisms continue work at high doses of exposure to
armed groups, deleting the missing data would not change
the parameter estimate.
The recall period for survey questions ranged from
two weeks to one year, and these data are subject to re-
call bias. MAHFP, when broken down by month,
reflected previously published data on seasonal food se-
curity trends, suggesting bias here was minimal [32, 50].
Herlihy et. al. suggest recall bias is minimal for trau-
matic events [51].
Respondents who experienced human rights violations
may have been more likely to recall self-protection activities
if a traumatic experience helped to trigger the memory. If
this was the case, the analysis of self-protection and rights
violations would have been biased towards showing stron-
ger associations between human rights violations and self-
protection.
Social desirability bias may be present if surveyors or
participants felt they would benefit from exaggerating
results that would make stronger advocacy. This issue was
covered extensively during training and was also written
into the informed consent in order to minimize this bias.
Although surveyors lived and worked in the areas they
were assigned to cover, it is possible that interviewees were
not comfortable discussing sensitive issues .such as health
or human rights violations. Due to logistical constraints, we
did not match surveyors and respondents by sex. During
the informed consent process, surveyors assured respon-
dents of anonymity and confidentiality, but it is possible
that sensitive information was underreported.
We did not measure mental health or self-reported
health, proximity to roads or rivers, or multiple expo-
sures to the same armed group. These measurements
may have enabled a more accurate analysis of determi-
nants of health.
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Conclusions
The ongoing peace process in southeastern Myanmar has
prompted a reduction in conflict and the best opportunity
for genuine peace in six decades, and this is being accom-
panied by an influx of development and health interven-
tions. The effects of militarization on health cannot be
overlooked when planning or evaluating public health in-
terventions in this area. Donors aiming to improve health
in Myanmar must address the problem of militarization,
and evaluations of public health interventions in south-
eastern Myanmar should include assessments of this and
also of human rights violations. Rural ethnic villages have
learned to cope with militarization, and international
agencies should respect and support these community
strategies when planning new programs.
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